We study the conditions under which the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies is order independent and we identify a class of discontinuous games for which order does not matter. In this way, we answer the open problem raised by M. Dufwenberg and M. Stegeman (2002) and generalize their main results. We also establish new theorems concerning the existence and uniqueness of the maximal game reduction when the pure strategies are dominated by mixed strategies.
Introduction
The question raised by Pearce (1984) , concerning the rationalizable strategic behaviour of the players in noncooperative strategic situations was followed by a great amount of literature. It seemed to attract the interest of researchers from Game theory. The first step of research in this area was made by Bernheim (1984) and Pearce (1984) , who defined the rationalizable strategies of a strategic game by using iterative processes of elimination of dominated strategies that were considered 'undesirable'.
This procedure led to the issue of order independence, which was studied by many authors. They searched for classes of games and defined dominance relations under which the result of the iterative process of removal of dominated strategies does not depend on the order of removal.
Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel (1990) provided conditions (including strict dominance) which guarantee the uniqueness of the reduced games. Marx and Swinkels (1997) defined nice weak dominance, proved that under this order relation, order does not matter. The main result of Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) concerns a class of games for which a unique and nonempty maximal reduction exists. The properties satisfied by games for which the iterated elimination for strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) preserves the set of Nash equilibria are the compactness of the strategy spaces and the continuity of payoff functions. The authors also proved that if, in addition, the payoff functions are upper semicontinuous in own strategies, then the order does not matter. Chen, Long and Luo (2007) provided a new definition of IESDS that proved to be suitable for all types of games and also orderindependent. Apt's approach (2007) uses operators on complete latice and their transfinite iterations. The monotonicity of the operators assures the order independence of iterated eliminations. Apt's paper (2007) provides an analysis of different ways of iterated eliminations of strategies. The notions of dominance and rationalizability are involved by other two strategy elimination procedures studied by Apt (2005) . In order to study the problem of order independence for rationalizability, the author considers three reduction relations on games and belief structures.
In this paper, we identify a class of discontinuous games for which order independence holds, generalizing the main results of Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) . The payoff functions are transfer weakly upper continuous in the sense of Tian and JZhou (1995) . These authors defined the transfer upper continuity and proved generalizations of Weierstrass and of the maximum theorem. We also establish results for game reductions in which the pure strategies are dominated by mixed strategies. We use some notions of measurability and especially some results of Robson (1990) .
The paper is organized in the following way: Section 2 contains preliminaries and notations. Generalizations of Dufwenberg-Stegeman Lemma are presented in Section 3. The mixed strategy case is treated in Section 4. The concluding remarks follow at the end.
Preliminaries
Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) concluded that it remained an open problem to identify classes of games for which order independence holds, outside of the compact and continuous class.
We are searching to solve this problem. In order to reach this aim, we first introduce the notions of games, parings, dominance and game reduction, following that, in the next subsection, we discuss the transfer upper continuity, a concept due to Tian and Zhou, which characterizes the payoff functions of a class of games which generalizes than that one of Dufwenberg and Stegeman. In section 3, we will prove that, in this case the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies (IESDS) also produces a unique maximal reduction.
Games, Parings, Dominance and Reduction
In the paper called "Equilibrium points in n-person games" (1950), Nash describes without formalizing, the concepts of the n-person game and the equilibrium of the attached game. He defines the n-person game, where each player has a finite number of strategies and each n-tuple of strategies corresponding to a given set of players wins. Any n-tuple of strategies can be regarded as a point in the product space of sets of players' strategies. A point of equilibrium is an n-tuple of strategies such that every player's strategy brings the maximum payout for that player, against n-1 strategies of the other ones.
We give the formal definition of an n-person game below.
Definition 1.
The normal form of an n-person game is G = (I, (G i ) i∈I , (r i ) i∈I ), where, for each i ∈ I = {1, 2, ..., n}, G i is a non-empty set (the set of individual strategies of player i) and r i is the preference relation on i∈I G i of player i.
The individual preferences r i are often represented by utility functions, i.e. for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} there exists a real valued function u i : i∈I G i → R (called the utility function of i), such that
Definition 2. The Nash equilibrium for the game (I, (G i ) i∈I , (u i ) i∈I ) is a point x * ∈ i∈I G i which satisfies for each i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} :
ii) own-uppersemicontinuous if u i (·, s −i ) is upper semicontinuous for each i ∈ I and for each s −i ∈ G −i ; iii) continuous if u i is continuous for each i ∈ I.
Definition 4. (Dufwenberg and Stegeman, 2002). A paring of G is a triple
H = (I, (H i ) i∈I , (u ′ i ) i∈I ), where H i ⊆ G i and u ′ i = u i| i∈I H i .
A pairing is nonempty if
Definition 5. Given a pairing H of G, the strict dominance relation ≻ H on G i can be defined:
Let us consider parings G, H with the property that H i ⊆ G i for each i ∈ I. We give here the definition of game reduction used by Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) , in order to generalize their main results, following that, in the next section we will introduce other types of reduction and discuss the relationships amongst them.
iii) the reduction G → * H is defined by the existence of (finite or countable infinite) sequence of parings
Transfer upper continuity
Tian and Zhou (1995)relaxed the continuity assumptions on functions and correspondences which can be used in some economic models. Their work was motivated by questions concerning the minimal conditions under which a function reaches its maximum on a compact set or the set of maximum points of a function defined on a compact set is non-empty and compact. Tian and Zhou introduced the transfer continuities and generalized the Weierstrass Theorem by giving a necessary and sufficient condition for a function f to reach its maximum on a compact set.
We are providing here the concepts of transfer upper semicontinuity and transfer weakly upper continuity for functions, the concept of transfer closedvaluedness for correspondences and some of their properties.
Let X, Y be subsets of topological spaces.
Definition 7. A function f : X → R is said to be upper semicontinuous on X if {x ∈ X : f (x) ≥ r} is closed in X for all r ∈ R. Definition 8. (Tian and Zhou, 1995) A function f : X → R ∪ {−∞} is said to be transfer upper continuous on X if for points x, y ∈ X, f (y) < f (x) implies that there exists a point x ′ ∈ X and a neighborhood N (y) of y such that f (z) < f (x ′ ) for all z ∈ N (y).
Definition 9.
(Tian and Zhou, 1995) A correspondence F : X → 2 Y is said to be transfer closed-valued on X if for every x ∈ X, y / ∈ F (x) implies that there exists x ′ ∈ X such that y / ∈clF (x ′ ).
Remark 2. (Tian and Zhou, 1995) It is clear that, for any function f : X → R ∪ {−∞}, the correspondence F : X → 2 X defined by F (x) = {y ∈ X : f (y) ≥ f (x)} for all x ∈ X is transfer closed-valued on X if and only if f is transfer upper continuous on X.
The next lemma characterizes the correspondences which have transfer closed-values. The next property is a necessary condition for a function to have a maximum on a choice set G.
Definition 10. (Tian and Zhou, 1995) A function f : X → R ∪ {−∞} is said to be transfer weakly upper continuous on X if, for points x, y ∈ X, f (y) < f (x) implies that there exists a point x ′ ∈ X and a neighbourhood
Theorem 1 generalizes the Weierstrass theorem.
Theorem 2. (Tian and Zhou, 1995) Let X be a compact subset of a topological space and let f : X → R ∪ {−∞} be a function. Then f reaches its maximum on X if and only if f is transfer weakly upper continuous on X.
Morgan and Scalzo (2007) defined the upper pseudocontinuity and proved the existence of Nash equilibrium for economic models with payoff functions having this property. 
Generalizations of Dufwenberg-Stegeman Lemma
The following lemma is due to Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) .
* H for some compact and own-uppersemicontinuous game G, and y ≻ H x for some x, y ∈ G i and i ∈ I, then there exists z
Let G → H be a game reduction. We introduce the following definition.
Definition 12. ≻ H has property K if for each i ∈ I and for each y ∈ G i , there exists z 0 ∈ G i with z 0 H y such that {z ∈ G i : z H z 0 } is compact.
Lemma 3 generalizes the Dufwenberg-Stegeman Lemma by relaxing the continuity assumption on the payoff functions of the game. We use the notion of transfer upper continuity due to Tian and Zhou (1995) . Note that G may not be compact.
Before stating the lemma, we define two types of discontinuous games.
ii) own transfer weakly upper continuous if u i (·, s −i ) is transfer weakly upper continuous for each i ∈ I and for each s −i ∈ G −i ; Lemma 4. Let us assume that G → * H for an own-transfer weakly upper continuous game G and ≻ H has property K. If y ≻ H x for some x, y ∈ G i and i ∈ I, then there exists z
Since f is transfer weakly upper continuous on U, f reaches its maximum in z * ∈ U ⊂ Z. We note that z
We notice that, for each y ∈ G 2 , u i (., y) is transfer weakly upper continuous on [0,2] and u i (., y) is not upper semicontinuous at x = 0.
We prove that ≻ H has property K :
If y ∈ (0, 1), there exists z 0 = 3 2 such that U(
We have that for any x, y ∈ [0, 2] such that y ≻ H x, there exists z
we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 5. Let assume that G is an own-transfer weakly upper continuous game G and ≻ G has property K. If y ≻ G x for some x, y ∈ G i and i ∈ I, then there exists z
If in the last corollary, the game G is transfer upper semicontinuous and compact, we obtain the following result.
Corollary 6. Let assume that G is a compact, own transfer upper semicontinuous game G. If y ≻ G x for some x, y ∈ G i and i ∈ I, then there exists
In order to obtain other generalization of Dufwenberg-Stegeman Lemma (2002), we further define the property M for a function u. Definition 14. Let X be a subset of a topological space. The function u : X → R ∪ {−∞} has the property M on X if for each y ∈ X, x ∈cl{z ∈ X :
We provide an example of transfer weakly upper continuous function which verifies the property M.
First, let y ∈ Q. For example, let y = Lemma 7. Let us assume that G → * H for a compact and own-transfer weakly upper continuous game G and for each i ∈ I and for each s −i ∈ H −i , the function u i (·, s −i ) has property M. If y ≻ H x for some x, y ∈ G i and i ∈ I, then there exists z
Proof. Since G → * H, there exists a sequence of parings A t , t = 0, 1, 2...
Since f is transfer weakly upper continuous on Z, f attains its maximum in z * ∈ Z. Each u i has property M and then we conclude that for each
We have y ≻ H x and this fact implies z
If H = G, we obtain the following corollary.
Corollary 8. Let us assume that G is a compact and own-transfer weakly upper continuous game G and for each i ∈ I and for each s −i ∈ G −i , the function u i (·, s −i ) has property M. If y ≻ G x for some x, y ∈ G i and i ∈ I, then there exists z
The next theorem is Theorem 1 in Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) . It is the main result concerning the existence and uniqueness of nonempty maximal reductions of compact and continuous games. We generalize the theorem above by weakening the continuity conditions on payoff functions which describe the game model. In order to do this, we introduce the following definition.
Definition 15. The reduction G → * * H is defined by the existence of (finite or countable infinite) sequence of parings A t of G, t = 0, 1, 2..., such that
x if x ∈ R\Q. For each y ∈ [0, 1], the function u 1 (·, y) is not upper semicontinuous, but it is transfer upper continuous since, for a neighborhood N ⊂ [0, 1], we may choose any x ′ rational such that sup{x : x ∈ N } < x′ ≤ 1. We prove that u 1 fulfills the intersection property with respect to x.
We have that
Definition 17. The game G has the intersection property if u i : G → R has the intersection property with respect to the i th variable for each i ∈ I.
Theorem 10. a) Let G be an own-transfer weakly upper continuous game which has also the intersection property, such that ≻ H has property K for every G → H. Then, any nonempty maximal reduction G → * * M is the unique maximal reduction. b) If G is a compact, own-transfer upper continuous game such that ≻ H has property K for every G → H, then it has a nonempty compact owntransfer upper semicontinuous maximal (→ * * ) reduction M and this reduction is unique.
Proof. a) The proof follows the same line as Theorem 1 of Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002). b) We prove that if G → H fast, then H is compact and nonempty. Since y ≻ G x for some x, y ∈ G i , then H i = ∅.
We will show further that
∈ H i , there exists x ∈ G i such that x ≻ G z and according to Corrolary 2, it follows that there exists x * ∈ G i such that x * ≻ G z. The last assertion implies that z / ∈ Z i (x * ) and therefore, z / ∈ ∩ x∈H i Z i (x). We have ∩ x∈H i Z i (x) ⊆ H i and the equality H i = ∩ x∈H i Z i (x) follows from the above assertions. Now let us define
Since we have the reduction G → * * H, the function u i (., s −i ) is transfer upper continuous on H i for s −i fixed, and, according to Lemma 1, it follows that
Therefore,
We consider C(t) t = 0, 1, ... the unique sequence of subgames of G such that C(0) = G and C(t) → C(t + 1) is fast for each t ≥ 0. The set C(t) is compact and nonempty for each t ≥ 0. The game M i = ∩ t≥0 C(t) is compact, transfer upper semicontinuous and nonempty. We show that M is a maximal (→ * * )-reduction of G. Consider any player i and
) −i is compact and ∩ t≥0 (C(t)) −i is nonempty and compact.
Let
Since M −i = ∅, it follows that X ′ = ∅ and therefore y ⊁ M x and M is maximal.
Corollary 11. The results also mainntain for the class of upper pseudocontinuous games.
By applying Lemma 4 , we obtain the following result.
Theorem 12. a) Let G be a compact and own-transfer weakly upper continuous game which has also the intersection property, such that for each i ∈ I, the payoff function u i has property M. Then, any nonempty maximal reduction G → * * M is the unique maximal reduction.
b) If G is a compact, own-transfer upper continuous game such that for each i ∈ I, the payoff function u i has property M, then it has a nonempty compact own-transfer upper semicontinuous maximal (→ * * ) reduction M. The reduction M is unique.
The Mixed Strategies Case
In Subsection 6.2 Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) approached the issue of mixed strategy dominance. They distinguished between the case in which a pure strategy is dominated by a pure strategy and the case in which it is domintated by a mixed strategy. The main result is obtained by applying Theorem 1 to the mixed extensions of finite games. We will extend Dufwenberg and Stegeman's research by taking into consideration several types of dominance relations and game reductions.
For the reader's convenience, we review here a few basic notions and notations which deal with measurability. For an overview, please see Parthasarathy (2005).
Measurable spaces
Suppose that (G, G) is a measurable space and H ∈ G. Let us define H = {H ∩ A : A ∈ G}. Then H is a σ−algebra of subsets of H and (H, H) is a measurable space.
Definition 18. Given a measurable space (G, G) and x ∈ G, define the probability measure δ x as
δ x is called the Dirac measure with unit mass at x.
Theorem 13. Let X be a finite set with a discrete σ−algebra. Then, every probability µ on this measurable space can be unique represented in the form µ = x∈X c x δ x , where c x ∈ [0, 1] ∀x ∈ X, x∈X c x = 1, thus µ(E) = x∈E c x for all E ⊂ X. Notation If (G, G) is a measurable space, we will denote by ∆(G) the set of probability measures defined on G.
Let I = {1, 2, ..., n} and the game G = (G i , u i ) i∈I . Assume that for each i ∈ I, G i is a compact subset in a metric space X and u i (.,
Each u i is measurable since it is upper semicontinuous and since it is also bounded, it is integrable. We denote by ∆(G i ) the set of probability measure on the set of Borel sets on G i . ∆(G i ) will be equipped with the weak topology. Theorem 14. Let G be a subset of a metric space. Then, G is compact if and only if ∆(G) is compact.
A mixed strategy for player i is an element µ i ∈ ∆(G i ).
Definition 19. (Billingsley (1968), p 7)
. Suppose {µ n } n≥1 , µ n belong to ∆(G), the set of probability measures on the Borel sets of some compact metric space G. Then "µ n weakly converges to µ", written µ n w → µ iff f dµ n → f dµ for all f : G → R, f continuous. This topology is consistent with Prohorov metric.
Lemma 15. (Robson 1990
). Consider u : G → R un upper semicontinuous function, where G is a compact metric space. It follows that udµ is upper semicontinuous in µ : lim sup n udµ n ≤ udµ if (µ n ) n , µ ∈ ∆(G), the set of probability measures on Borel sets of G and µ n w → µ.
We define the following extension of ≻ H :
finite, G i is a subset of a metric space X for each i ∈ I. Let ∆(G i ) be the set of probability measures on Borel sets of G i and V i (.,
Lemma 17. If G → * H for some compact and own-upper semicontinuous game G and y ≻ H x for some x, y ∈ G i and i ∈ I, then, there exists z
Proof. The assumptions of Dufwenberg-Stegeman Lemma are fulfilled. Then there exists z
We note that z
Types of dominance relations and reductions
Let I be a finite set. For each i ∈ I, let (G i , G i ) be a measurable space,
Definition 21. We define the followings types of dominance relations.
We obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 18. With the notations above, we have the following relations amongst the former types of dominance:
To prove this fact, we take µ = δ s j for j = i,
Let us consider parings G, H with the property that H i ⊆ G i for each i ∈ I. In addition to the game reduction used by Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002) , we present the following ones.
Definition 22. i) (Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel 1990 
We will need the following theorem.
Theorem 19. There are the following relations amongst the former types of reductions.
According to Theorem 7, it follows that H i ⊂ G i for each i ∈ I and for each m ∈ ∆(
If m = δ x with x ∈ G i \H i , we have that H i ⊂ G i for each i ∈ I and for each x ∈ G i \H i , there exists µ ∈ ∆(H i ) such that µ ≻ H x, which is equivalent with G ⇒ H.
iii) The implication are true from i) and ii).
Proof. The direct implication " =⇒ " comes from Theorem 8, ii). We prove " ⇐= ". Let
Let m ∈ ∆(G i )\∆(H i ). According to Theorem 5, m can be unique represented as a convex combination of Dirac measures δ x , x ∈ G i \H i . Then, there exists unique c x ∈ [0, 1], x∈G i \H i c x = 1 such that m = x∈G i \H i c x δ x . But, as we noted above, for each δ x with x ∈ G i \H i , there exists µ x ∈ ∆(H i ) such that µ x ≻ H δ x . Therefore, µ = x∈G i \H i c x µ x is a probability measure on G i \H i and µ x ≻ H m.
From 1) and 2), it follows that for m ∈ ∆(
Dufwenberg-Stegeman-like Lemma
We study first the case of the game reduction G → H.
Lemma 23. In the case of a finite game, Lemma Dufwenberg-Stegeman remains true for the game reduction G → H.
, according to Theorem 9 and Theorem 8. Let µ ′ ≻ H x for some x ∈ G i and µ
We also obtain the next result concerning the game reduction G → * H.
Existence and uniqueness of maximal reductions
The main result of Section 4 is Theorem 11.
Theorem 27. Let G = (I, (G i ) i∈I , (u i ) i∈I ) be a strategic game such that I is a finite set and for each i ∈ I, G i is a nonempty compact subset of a metric space, u i : i∈I G i → R is upper semicontinuous in each argument and for each
Then, G has a unique nonempty maximal ( → * ) reduction M and M is nonempty, compact and upper semicontinuous.
Proof. The game (I, (∆(G i )) i∈I , (V i ) i∈I ) is also compact and own-uppersemicontinuous. According to Lemma 8, we have that if µ ′ ≻ H x for some x ∈ G i and µ
The proof of the uniqueness of M follows the same line as the proof of Theorem 1a) of Dufwenberg-Stegeman. Now we are proving that, if G is compact and own-upper semicontinuous and G → H fast, then H is compact and nonempty.
Choose i ∈ I such that H i = G i . Since µ > G x for some x ∈ G i , µ ∈ ∆(G i ), according to Corollary 4, we have that H i = ∅. It remains to show that H i is compact. Choose µ ∈ ∆(H i ) and let Let
The set Z i (µ) is nonempty. In order to prove this fact, we will assume the opposite: Z i (µ) = ∅. In this case, V i (µ, s −i ) > u i (s, s −i ) for each s ∈ G i and for each s −i ∈ G −i , and it follows that µ > G s for each s ∈ G i . We can conclude that µ ≻ H s for each s ∈ G i , and, since G ⇒ H fast, we have that (for each s ∈ G i ⇒ s / ∈ H i ) and, then, H i is an empty set, and we reached a contradiction. Now let us define F i (µ, s −i ) = {s i ∈ G i : V i (µ, s −i ) ≤ u i (s i , s −i )} and then, Z i (µ) = ∩ s −i ∈Z −i (µ) F i (x, s −i ).
Since u i (., s −i ) is upper semicontinuous for each s −i ∈ G −i , we have that Z i (µ) is closed as being an intersection of closed subsets. We will show that H i = ∩ µ∈∆(H i ) Z i (µ).
Let us consider x ∈ G i . For any µ ∈ ∆(H i ), if x / ∈ Z(µ), we have that V i (µ, s −i ) > u i (x, s −i ) for each s −i ∈ G −i and, therefore µ > G x. Then x / ∈ H i and H i ⊆ ∩ µ∈∆(H i ) Z(µ).
If x /
∈ H i , then µ > G x for some µ ∈ ∆(G i ) and Lemma 8 implies that there exists µ * ∈ ∆(G i ) such that µ * > G x and therefore, x / ∈ Z(µ * ) and we can conclude that x / ∈ ∩ µ∈∆(H i ) Z(µ). Therefore, H i ⊇ ∩ µ∈∆(H i ) Z(µ). The equality H i = ∩ µ∈∆(H i ) Z i (µ) holds and, since Z i (µ) is closed for all µ, H i is also closed and therefore compact.
Let C (t) , t = 0, 1, ... denote the unique sequence of subgames of G such that C(0) = G and C(t) → C(t + 1) is fast for each t ≥ 0. We have that C(t) is compact and nonempty for each t ≥ 0. It follows that M i = ∩ t∈C(t) i is compact, nonempty for each i ∈ I.
We will show that M is a maximal ( → * ) reduction of G. Let x ∈ M i , µ ∈ ∆(M i ). Let X(t) = {s −i ∈ C(t) −i : V i (µ, s −i ) ≤ u i (x, s −i )}. If X(t) = ∅ for each t such that C(t) = M, then µ ≻ C(t) x, contradiction. Therefore, X(t) = ∅. The set C(t) −i is compact for each t such that C(t) = M. Then, M −i = ∅ and it follows that the set X = {s −i ∈ M −i : V i (µ, s −i ) ≤ u i (x, s −i )} is nonempty. We conclude that µ ⊁ M x.
Concluding remarks
We identified a class of discontinuous games for which the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies produce a unique maximal reduction that is nonempty. We also provided conditions under which order independence remains valid for the case that the pure strategies are dominated by mixed strategies. Our results expel M. Dufwenberg and M. Stegeman's idea in [6] that 'the proper definition and the role of iterated strict dominance is unclear for games that are not compact and continuous'. G. Tian and J. Zhou's notion of transfer upper continuity proved to be a suitable assumption for the payoff functions of a game in order to obtain our results. Their Weierstrass-like theorem for transfer weakly upper continuous functions defined on a compact set was the key of the proofs of Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. We can conclude and emphasize that, even outside the continuous class of games, the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies remains an interesting procedure.
